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Many ameliorative projects aim at moral goods such as social equality. For exam-
ple, the amelioration of the conceptmarriage forms part of eorts to achieve equal
rights for the LGBT+ community. What does implementation of such an amelio-
rated concept consist in? In this paper, I argue that, for some ameliorated concepts,
successful implementation requires that individuals eschew semantic deference, at
least with respect to relevant dimensions of the concept. My argument appeals to
consideration of the aims of conceptual engineers engaged in this type of ameliora-
tive project: they seek conceptual change in order to contribute to the dismantling
of oppressive social structures, institutions, and systems of belief. I argue that, for
such aims to be achieved, it must be the case that individuals who come to endorse
the concept do so for the right reasons—because they have gained an understanding
of why the ameliorated concept is morally preferable to its ancestor. Once they have
acquired such reasons, however, they are no longer correctly described as semanti-
cally deferential; they will treat moral reasons to employ the concept as overriding
of semantic considerations.
Keywords: conceptual engineering, semantic deference, amelioration, implementa-
tion
1. Introduction
Many of the concepts we possess are products of the social world we live in;
they can also shape the ways in which we represent and make sense of this
world. As such, it is not surprising that concepts can reect, perpetuate, or
obfuscate those features of our social world that are ethically problematic.
Concepts may more or less explicitly embed assumptions that contribute to
oppression; or they may simply fail to be politically useful ways to repre-
sent a particular phenomenon or group. Critical scrutiny of the concepts
we inherit from our language community, then, is of great importance in ef-
forts to achieve social equality. Where a concept is found to be problematic,
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it should be transformed into something better, or perhaps eliminated from
our repertoire altogether.is is the job of the conceptual engineer: concep-
tual engineers are interested in what concepts we should have, where those
that we do in fact employ may fail to serve our moral, political or theoretical
purposes.
My interest in this paper is with conceptual engineering projects that
aim at social equality. For example, engineering of the concept marriage
forms part of eorts to achieve equality for the LGBT+ community.e en-
gineering of marriage is an instance of ameliorative analysis: the concept
is improved or replaced with a better one. Once the initial ameliorative anal-
ysis has been carried out, the resultant concept must then be implemented
in a target community. My aim in this paper is to argue for one condition
on the successful implementation of some kinds of ameliorated concept. I
will argue that (for some concepts) successful implementation requires that
the individual who acquires the ameliorated concept eschews semantic def-
erence with respect to this concept (or certain dimensions of this concept).
e reason for this is that, in these cases, successful implementation requires
that individuals treat moral reasons to use concepts as overriding of seman-
tic considerations.
e paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce ameliorative
analysis. In Section 3, I introduce some assumptions and preliminary re-
marks concerning concepts and semantic deference. In Section 4, I argue
for the relationship between successful implementation of ameliorated con-
cepts and semantic deference.
2. Engineering concepts for social equality
An ameliorative analysis begins by identifying a defect in some existing con-
cept. A proposal is then developed for improving the concept to remove the
defect.1 e result is a new concept or, perhaps, an improved version of the
old one.2 In what follows, I will refer to the original concept as the “de-
cient” or “ancestor” concept, and the concept that results from amelioration
as the “ameliorated” or “new” concept. I will focus on the amelioration of
the concept marriage as my central example. e ameliorative analysis of
marriage has both a conceptual and a legal dimension. On the conceptual
level, the project is to improve the concept such that, where it previously
could apply only to partnerships between a man and a woman, it should
1 Simion (2018) argues that concepts do not need to be defective in order for us to want to
improve them through revisions.
2 Not all authors would describe ameliorative analysis this way. Haslanger (2006), for exam-
ple, suggests that ameliorative analysis can be a process of revealing the nature of existing
concepts.
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instead be broadened such that it is inclusive of partnerships between indi-
viduals of any sex/gender, such as same-sex partnerships. One of the reasons
to seek this improvement is that it can aid in the eort to secure marriage
equality; that is, to secure marriage as a legal right for those in the LGBT+
community to whom it is currently denied. However, one could also be in
favour of the conceptual broadening of marriage even if one thought that
the legal institution of marriage should be abolished altogether (Card 1996,
Young 1997).e amelioration of marriage aims at various goods intended
to contribute to equality for the LGBT+ community. For example, the legal
institution of marriage, in many countries, comes with signicant economic
and legal benets that are not otherwise available to partners in a relation-
ship.3 Aside from these benets, though, the ameliorative projectmight con-
tribute to combating further dimensions of heterosexism. Callahan (2009),
for example, points out that the benets that are available to married part-
ners have been symbolic of the fact that the state holds only heterosexual
relationships and families as legitimate and worthy of protection; and Cal-
houn (2002) argues that the denial of marriage equality contributes to a cul-
tural conception of lesbians and gay men as defective citizens. I will return
to Calhoun’s argument in Section 4.
As demonstrated in this sort of example, an ameliorative project can
aim at a range of eects in dierent communities, where these eects are
hoped to contribute to achieving and sustaining social equality for oppressed
groups. Few, if any, of these eects will be achieved by merely ameliorating
a concept, however. Rather, the success of an ameliorative project requires
that the concept be implemented in a target community or communities.
Ameliorative projects alone are surely not sucient to achieve social equal-
ity for any given group. However, they can contribute to this end; and it is
only when a concept is implemented in a target community that it can start
to have some kind of impact on things like social structures, institutions,
the belief systems of individuals, and so forth. Successful implementation
within a target community might require uptake and retention of the con-
cept amongst some or all of its individual members, depending on the aims
of the ameliorative project.4 In this paper, I will restrict my focus to the
question of what successful implementation demands of an individual who
acquires the ameliorated concept. I argue that, for some concepts, successful
implementation (with respect to an individual) requires that the individual
who acquires the concept does not semantically defer with respect to its ap-
plication (or relevant dimensions of its application). Before arguing for this
3 Card (1996) argues that these benets rendermarriage an unjust and dangerous institution
that should be abolished.
4 ank you to Alex Davies for pressing me to be clearer about this issue.
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claim, I will rst say a bit about how I am understanding both concepts and
semantic deference.
3. Concepts and semantic deference
ere are a great many views as to what concepts are and how they are indi-
viduated.5 However, theories of concepts, despite their dierences, tend to
agree (more or less) on a range of desiderata that specify the sorts of roles that
concepts play in an individual’s cognitive life and interactions with others.
Concepts are the components of thought contents and, as such, are supposed
to be central to understanding phenomena such as categorisation, learning,
reasoning, communication, and intentional action. Whether one thinks that
concepts are the physical realizers of conceptual roles in an individual, or
abstract objects determined by patterns of use across an entire community,
one will typically take one’s theory to be answerable to such desiderata. Be-
yond this rough characterisation of the theoretical role of concepts, I wish to
remain largely neutral regarding which theory of concepts is correct.6 How-
ever, I will make a few assumptions that rule out some approaches. Firstly,
I assume that, whatever concepts are, they are the sorts of things that can
(perhaps only with great eort) be deliberately altered in predictable ways.
Not all approaches allow for this. Cappelen’s (2018) Austerity Framework,
for example, claims that the sort of deliberate engineering of concepts de-
scribed by those engaged in ameliorative analysis is not possible.7 For the
purposes of this paper, I am going to set aside Cappelen’s worries. I restrict
my focus to theories that claim that conceptual engineering is a process that
is under our control and within our ken. Secondly, I assume that the ame-
lioration of an existing concept is a matter of an individual, or group of in-
dividuals, developing a new concept—one that is not type-identical to the
old.8 I think this assumption will not be too controversial. It is plausible
that conceptual engineers can simultaneously possess both the ameliorated
concept and its decient ancestor. Many conceptual engineers will be ex-
perts on both concepts—understanding how the ancestor concept is in fact
5 For a range of approaches to content individuation, see (Rapaport 2002), (Farkas 2008),
(Chalmers 2002), (Burge 1979), (Jackman 2005), (Millikan 1989), (Fodor 1987).
6 For the reader who nds this attempt at neutrality unhelpful, I think my argument can be
run using talk of inferential roles.
7 Cappelen states his framework in terms of the extensions and intensions of expressions
rather than concepts, but his points about control and inscrutability can be carried over to
mental content.
8 In claiming that this is a new concept, I do not mean to suggest that it amounts to a change
of topic. For accounts of topic continuity, see (Cappelen 2018), (Prinzing 2018), (Sawyer
2018).
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employed in a community, whilst nonetheless believing that it should not be
employed.9
Aside from those views ruled out by my assumptions, the argument that
I wish tomake is compatible withmany views of concepts. However, the ter-
minology best used to frame it might dier slightly depending on whether
one takes concepts to be prototypes or inferential roles, or internally or ex-
ternally individuated, or what have you.10 at individuals are disposed to
defer with respect to many of the concepts and expressions they employ is
a datum that any theory of concepts should seek to be consistent with; and
we can theorise about when individuals ought to defer without rst settling
the question of what concepts are. I will have more to say about semantic
deference in Section 4. For now, let us say that semantic deference is the
phenomenon whereby an individual accepts correction with respect to her
application of an expression or concept from those she deems to be more
expert language users. e relationships of deference between individuals
form a structure that links lay speakers with (those who are perceived to be)
the most competent, or “expert”, speakers at the top. As Burge writes:
We may imagine a vast, ragged network of interdependence, estab-
lished by patterns of deference which lead back to people who would
elicit the assent of others. [. . . ] To put it crudely, a person counts as
among the most competent if he or she would be persuasive to other
competent speakers in the use and explication of the language. (Burge
1986, 702)
Semantic deference is a phenomenon that is most commonly discussed in
connection with social externalism.is is the view that concepts are indi-
viduated, in part, by an individual’s social environment (Burge 1979, Gold-
berg 2007).11 For a social externalist, an individual’s dispositions to defer
allow her to share in an inventory of communal concepts (Burge 1979, 114).
However, other approaches to concepts can allow that there is such a phe-
nomenon as semantic deference. Content internalists, for example, will agree
that subjects oen accept correction from those they deemmore competent;
what they deny is that these dispositions enable subjects to possess com-
munal concepts that they do not understand. For the internalist, typically,
9 ank you to Ishani Maitra for this point.
10 I will note when such dierences of terminology are required as they become relevant.
11 Burge’s considered view oen seems closer to a form of physical externalism; he claims
that the physical environment plays a more decisive role in content individuation (1986;
1988; 1979, fn 2). Sawyer (2018) endorses a pure social externalism for semantic content,
but not for thought content. She claims that semantic content is determined by what the
community would agree to aer reaching reective equilibrium in debate. Concepts, on
the other hand, are individuated by relations to real entities and kinds in the environment.
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having deferential dispositions indicates that subjects desire to acquire those
concepts that most closely approximate the concepts of the experts. In what
follows, I argue that, for some concepts, successful implementation of these
concepts (for an individual) requires that the individual who acquires them
is no longer semantically deferential with respect to their application.
4. Implementation
A full account of successful implementation is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. However, before getting to my argument, it will be useful to identify
some further conditions on implementation that are less controversial.
4.1 Understanding and endorsement
One such condition (depending on one’s theory of acquisition) is that an in-
dividualmust not only acquire but also understand the ameliorated concept,
at least along certain dimensions.12 With respect to the sort of example un-
der consideration, the social changes at which the ameliorative project aims
require that individuals form new beliefs (and jettison old beliefs) about the
nature of the phenomenon represented by the relevant concept, which track
the proposed conceptual change. For example, agents need to believe that it
is possible for marriages to be formed between partners of any sex/gender.
Forming these beliefs will oen require a signicant degree of conceptual
understanding of the ameliorated concept, as well as understanding of some
of the concepts with which the central concept interlocks. It may some-
times be the case that full understanding, or conceptual mastery, is required
for implementation. However, there may also be cases in which an indi-
vidual need only understand the ameliorated concept along certain relevant
dimensions.13 For ease of exposition, I will oen talk of an individual’s need
to understand “the concept”, but I do not intend to claim anything stronger
than that shemust understand this concept along dimensions relevant to the
ameliorative project.
Another condition that might be required (depending on one’s account
of conceptual understanding) is that the individual “endorse” the amelio-
rated concept. On some views, even a condition as strong as conceptmastery
would require only that an individual fully understand a concept; it would
not require that she actually apply it to the group or phenomenon for which
12 is way of framing the point is more congenial to externalist views. Many internalists will
claim that one cannot possess concepts that one does not understand; as such, acquisition
and mastery do not come apart.
13 ank you to Je Engelhardt for this point.
Joey Pollock 87
it was designed.14 Returning to our thought from earlier: implementation
requires that individuals form andmaintain certain kinds of belief about the
objects and phenomena represented by the ameliorated concept. Mastering
a concept requires, at most, that a subject grasp (perhaps implicitly) the con-
ditions under which the concept purports to apply. As noted above, the po-
sition that many conceptual engineers may occupy is that of mastering both
the ameliorated concept and its decient ancestor, whilst believing only one
of these ought to apply. ose resistant to the proposed amelioration may
possess both concepts whilst endorsing only the ancestor. If an individual
acquires the ameliorated concept but does not use it in place of its ancestor;
or, worse, if she masters the new concept only so that she may more eec-
tively design barriers to its uptake in a community, I think it is clear that the
implementation has not been successful. Successful implementation, then,
should require that the individual endorse the concept over its ancestor, not
merely that she understand it.15
To recap: for the implementation of an ameliorated concept in an indi-
vidual’s conceptual repertoire, so far, we have it that she must understand
the concept (at least along certain relevant dimensions) and she must en-
dorse the concept over its ancestor. In what follows, I will argue that this
alone would not be sucient for successful implementation for some kinds
of ameliorative project. In some cases, the individual must not only endorse
the new concept, she must do so for specic reasons: she should endorse
the concept, not because others do, but because she thinks it is the right
thing to do, morally speaking. I will rst explain why the moral reasons for
employing a concept should be considered important to implementation in
the kinds of ameliorative project under consideration; I will then argue that
the condition requires giving up on semantic deference (with respect to the
concept, or relevant dimensions of it).
4.2 Implementation and deference
e kind of reasons that are relevant tomy argument aremotivating reasons:
reasons that explainwhy an individual endorses the concepts that she does.16
14 Some views of conceptmastery incorporate endorsement into their conditions onmastery.
See (Rabin 2018) for an argument against this kind of approach. Rabin argues for a “recog-
nition” view of mastery according to which mastering a concept is a matter of correctly
recognising certain core elements as governing the use of the concept (without necessarily
endorsing these elements).
15 Ameliorative projects may not always aim to replace a decient concept with just one new
concept.ere may be cases where a plurality of ameliorated concepts is useful (See Brig-
andt and Rosario, forthcoming).
16 I do not mean to suggest that there are no such things as normative reasons for endorsing
a concept. Conceptual engineers who aim at moral goods can be wrong about which con-
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For many concepts, the reason that we use them is just that other people do.
Conceptual engineers, as theorists engaged in the project of critiquing the
concepts we inherit from others, will typically have dierent sorts of reasons
for using ameliorated concepts—ameliorated concepts are used because they
are thought to better serve various purposes than their inherited ancestors.
Certainly, the reasons for ameliorating a concept are important to theorists
and activists; but why should we think that it is also important that such
reasons are taken on board by the individuals who adopt the new concept?
Roughly, the idea is this: as noted earlier, in ameliorative projects of the
sort under consideration, engineers are motivated by the pursuit of moral
goods—they are interested in contributing to the dismantling of oppressive
social structures, institutions and systems of belief, and replacing them with
those that will promote and sustain social equality. When, in implement-
ing an ameliorated concept, engineers seek to transmit their own motivat-
ing reasons to the individuals who adopt the new concept, it is because ac-
ceptance of these reasons is partly constitutive of the sorts of changes that
they wish to eect—individuals who adopt the new concept ought (if the
project is to be considered successful) to be appropriately motivated by spe-
cic moral considerations. Calhoun (2002) is explicit about the importance
of transmitting such reasons. She writes that, “e moral signicance of ex-
tending rights is to a large extent a function of the sorts of arguments that
get culturally circulated in the process of extending rights” (Calhoun 2002,
109).17 Calhoun is here focused on the issue of extending legal rights, rather
than on ameliorating concepts. I do not wish to attribute to her any partic-
ular view regarding conceptual engineering and implementation. However,
I do think that her remarks regarding arguments for extending rights are
equally applicable to the implementation of ameliorated concepts.18
To see why the circulation of reasons is important to implementation,
it will be useful to look at Calhoun’s argument for the pursuit of marriage
equality in more detail.19 Calhoun considers a number of potential moral
arguments in favour of marriage equality and its priority on the political
cepts are morally preferable and, thus, depending on one’s view of normative reasons, an
individual may have amoral reason not to employ these concepts in this second sense. For
the distinction between normative andmotivating reasons, see, e.g., (Dancy 2002), (Smith
1994).
17 e same point is made by Richardson-Self (2015, 127). Richardson-Self evaluates a range
of arguments in favour of marriage equality, including Calhoun’s.
18 One might also think that altering concepts is required in order to achieve uptake of par-
ticular justications for extending rights.
19 Calhoun focuses on the importance of marriage equality for lesbians and gay men. I will
follow her own presentation of her argument, but I think similar considerations are rele-
vant to other kinds of non-heterosexual orientations.
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agenda, many of which she rejects. One option that she considers is that
marriage equality might help to undermine sexism and male dominance
(Calhoun 2002, 115)—for example, by promoting the idea that gendered
husband/wife roles are inessential to marriage and thus encouraging het-
erosexuals to adopt more egalitarian relationship models. Calhoun thinks
that this is not the right argument to circulate, for several reasons. One of
those reasons is that, in framing the injustice of same-sex marriage bars in
terms of gender inequality, this approach fails to acknowledge that hetero-
sexual domination is an axis of oppression in its own right: she argues that
the forms of oppression suered by the LGBT+ community are distinct from
gender-based oppression and cannot be explained solely in terms of it. Cal-
houn’s preferred argument runs as follows. She argues that being deemed
t for marriage is culturally bound up with what it means to be a true citi-
zen. is is because the dominant cultural conception of marriage treats it
as a pre-political institution: it is not something that is created by the state;
instead the very possibility of civil society depends on people entering mar-
riages and forming families.20 e state protects, promotes and regulates
marriage because it is thought to play this foundational role. In this ideol-
ogy, people who are deemed t to marry and form families have a special
status—they are necessary for the foundations of society. In contrast, those
who are deemedunt for this role have a lesser status. Bars on same-sexmar-
riage thus reect and perpetuate the ideology that lesbians and gay men are
inessential or lesser citizens who are unt for family life; Calhoun describes
them as displaced to outside civil society. We should pursue marriage equal-
ity, according to Calhoun, because bars to same-sex marriage play a central
role in the oppression of lesbians and gay men by displacing them in this
way.21
In relation to ameliorative analysis, one way we can describe these alter-
native arguments is as underpinning dierent concepts (or clusters of con-
cepts), each consistent with the conceptual change described at a more su-
percial level.22 An ameliorative strategy based onCalhoun’s workwould re-
quire that an individual endorse, not just any inclusivemarriage concept, but
the particular concept-cluster that she is proposing—for it is the endorse-
20 Calhoun here is focusing on conceptions of marriage in the USA, as expressed in the 1996
Defence of Marriage Act. She is not suggesting that this is a conception that we ought to
endorse.
21 Calhoun (2002, 128) notes that, beyond achieving marriage equality, there are dierent
revisions to the cultural conception of marriage that might be adopted. For example, we
might also reject the conception of marriage as a pre-political institution (although she
thinks that there are some reasons to retain this conception).
22 I do not mean to suggest that such arguments are reducible without remainder to the en-
dorsement of concept-clusters.
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ment of this concept-cluster that is needed to contribute to undermining
heterosexism in the way that she envisages. I think that this is not all that
should be required by the ameliorative project, however. For a Calhoun-
inspired ameliorative project to succeed, the reason that an individual ought
to endorse this concept-cluster is, not only because she believes that the cul-
tural conception of lesbians and gay men as defective citizens is central to
their oppression, but also that she believes that combatting such oppression
is themorally right course of action and ismotivated to choose such a course
of action. One could perhaps convince an individual to employ an inclusive
marriage concept (or concept-cluster) for other reasons. For example, per-
haps you can convince an individual to do so simply by paying her a lot of
money; but, in doing so, you will not have done very much to address her
heterosexist attitudes. is is not to say that there could be absolutely no
benet to getting individuals to employ ameliorated concepts for alterna-
tive reasons;23 but doing so would fall far short of the aims of an amelio-
rative project that sought to more comprehensively address the individual’s
morally problematic system of beliefs and dispositions.
is rst claim was a claim about the importance of the moral reasons
oered for endorsing the ameliorated concept (or concept-cluster): given
the aims of the ameliorative project, individuals should endorse the amelio-
rated concept for the engineer’s moral reasons because doing so is required
to overwrite specic existing problematic beliefs and dispositions with those
that will contribute to promoting and sustaining social equality for the rele-
vant group. I will now argue that, for the success of the sort of ameliorative
project under consideration, individuals ought no longer be semantically
deferential with respect to the concept they endorse (or relevant dimen-
sions of it). e claim here is not that the subject need not defer because
she has mastered the concept. As Burge explains, even subjects who master
a concept (and thus, in fact, need no correction) are not thereby rendered
non-deferential towards, or non-reliant on, the norms of their community
(Burge 1979, 84). Even where an individual masters a concept, it can be true
of her that, had expert use been dierent, shewould accept correction. What
I will argue is that an individual ought to treat hermoralmotivations for em-
ploying the new concept as overriding of semantic considerations, and this
renders her no longer semantically deferential with respect to that concept.
Consider an individual who has adopted the ameliorated concept,mar-
riageA, for the sorts of reasons presented by Calhoun. As already explained,
the aim of the relevant ameliorative project is to contribute to overwriting
23 Indeed, there may be cases in which there are signicant benets that can be gained from
convincing individuals to endorse ameliorated concepts even when they do so for alterna-
tive reasons.ank you to Alex Davies and Je Engelhardt for this point.
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specic beliefs and dispositions in the individual who adopts the concept.
Given this kind of aim, if the implementation of the ameliorated concept
is to be considered successful then, in coming to endorse marriageA, it
should not be the case that the individual has signed up to mean just what-
ever the experts mean by “marriage”, as she might in acquiring a concept like
arthritis. We should not consider the implementation to be successful if
the individual is willing to relinquish her problematic beliefs, but only to
the extent that doing so does not require her to use concepts or expressions
in ways that conict with the practices of her colinguals. A subject who
is willing to let semantic considerations outweigh moral considerations in
choosing what concepts to employ does not seem to be appropriately mo-
tivated to do the right thing. She should be using the new concept because
she has reason to think that it is the morally right (or morally better) con-
cept to employ, not because she has agged a semantic expert as someone to
whom she will defer with respect to future usage. If merely corrected in the
manner that a semantic expert corrects a lay speaker, she ought to resist this
correction. Successful implementation, then, requires, not just that individ-
uals have moral reasons to employ a concept, but that they treat their moral
reasons for employing a concept as overriding of competing considerations.
One thing that an objector may claim at this point is that, whilst imple-
menting an ameliorated concept might require inculcating some degree of
resilience in an agent, this resilience is compatible with the claim that the
agent is nonetheless semantically deferential. We might describe the situ-
ation thus: there are subjects who, with respect to some concepts, are dis-
posed to change their use with little persuasion, and there are subjects who
(for various reasons), are disposed to take signicantlymore persuasion. But
where a person sits on this spectrum, with respect to a given concept, is not
relevant to the question of whether they should be described as semantically
deferential: a subject can be highly resistant to changing their practice, re-
quiring much evidence and persuasion, and yet still qualify as semantically
deferential with respect to the relevant concept.24 Indeed, one of Burge’s
examples involves this kind of subject: one who believes sofas are religious
artefacts and is highly resistant (though not immune) to semantic correction
(Burge 1986, 263).
How should we respond to this objection? Given that individuals can
eschew communal standards, the question the objector must answer is this:
when a subject is deferential with respect to a concept, what disposition(s)
is it that she possesses (with respect to that concept) that she lacks when
it comes to concepts with respect to which she is non-deferential? In what
follows, I will explain what I think is Burge’s answer to this question and
24ank you to Sarah Sawyer for helpful discussion of this objection.
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argue that it supports my claim that subjects will be no longer semantically
deferential when they treat moral reasons to employ concepts as overriding.
Burge describes the dierences between semantically deferential and
non-deferential subjects in the following sorts of ways:
e subject’s willingness to submit his statement and belief to the
arbitration of an authority suggests a willingness to have his words
taken in the normal way—regardless of mistaken associations with
the word. Typically, the subject will regard recourse to a dictionary,
and to the rest of us, as at once a check on his usage and his belief.
When the verdict goes against him, he will not usually plead that we
have simply misunderstood his views. (Burge 1979, 101)
A person born and bred in the parent community might simply de-
cide (unilaterally) to follow the usage of the regional dialect or even to
fashionhis ownusagewith regard to particularwords, self-consciously
opting out of the parent community’s conventions in these particu-
lars. In such a case, members of the parent community would not,
and should not, attribute mental contents to him on the basis of ho-
mophonic construal of his words. (Burge 1979, 114)
to a fair degree, mentalistic attribution rests not on the subject’s hav-
ing mastered the contents of the attribution, and not on his having
behavioral dispositions peculiarly relevant to those contents, but on
his having a certain responsibility to communal conventions govern-
ing, and conceptions associated with, symbols that he is disposed to
use. (Burge 1979, 115)
What the above passages suggest is that, at least as Burge is conceiving of it,
the semantically deferring subject is one who takes a particular kind of rea-
son as relevant to her use of language and concepts: she is responsive to the
ways others use terms in her community and takes herself to be answerable
to this community’s standards.e evidence that she will treat as relevant to
her usage is of a particular kind: it is the kind found in a dictionary or ency-
clopaedia, or that can be gained from expert speakers.25 On this picture, a
subject can indeed be resistant to correction. But her reasons for resistance
will reect this kind of evidence: shemay be skeptical that a dictionary is up-
to-date, or that the alleged experts are semantically competent. When the
semantically deferential subject is resistant, then, it is because she is skep-
tical of claims as to the common standard. e non-deferential subject, in
25 Some versions of social externalism (including perhaps Burge’s) allow that experts can be
wrong in their explications of a concept. I think this approach can be accommodated in
the present discussion. On such a view, the ultimate check on usage that the semantically
deferential subject will be responsive to is the nature of the phenomenon or kind repre-
sented by the expert’s concept. A non-deferential subject, in contrast, would not take this
evidence as relevant to her use of concepts.
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contrast, rejects the common standard (with respect to some word-form).
She is thus not amenable to the same type of persuasion as the deferential
subject: convincing her that communal norms favour a particular usage of
some word-form is not relevant to her decision as to how to employ or un-
derstand the concept that she expresses with that word-form.
Let us return to our example of the resilient subject who refuses to revise
her marriageA concept in response to semantic correction. Is she resilient
due to skepticism as to the semantic competence of her corrector? at is,
does convincing her require dictionaries, encyclopaedias, or expert speak-
ers?e answer is no.ere are two reasons for this.e rst is that, given
that she has mastered the relevant dimensions of the ameliorated concept,
anyone suggesting that she ought to change her use along one of these di-
mensions must be proposing that she switch to employing a dierent con-
cept.26 Perhaps competing engineers have developed a concept (or concept-
cluster) that they think is superior; or perhaps the original engineers have
decided to revert back to the ancestor concept.e resilient subject will not
accept semantic correction under these circumstances. In fact, the question
of which concept to endorse (of several competing options) does not seem
like a question that semantic experts (qua semantic experts) are in a posi-
tion to answer: they will tell you how to understand the concepts that you
do in fact possess, but they are not really in the business of telling you which
concept to endorse in the rst place.27 e most they may claim in favour
of endorsing their preferred concept is that most language users (or perhaps
the most competent language users) endorse this concept. is sort of rea-
son will not override the resilient subject’s moral reasons for endorsing the
original ameliorated concept.
e objector may well agree with the above but claim that it fails to ad-
dress the manner in which the resilient subject is semantically deferential.
is brings us to the second point. Asmentioned above, Burge characterizes
semantic deference, in part, in terms of counterfactual dependency: even in
cases of actual mastery, if the subject’s social environment had been dier-
ent, she would accept correction.us, although she needs no correction in
the actual world, if she would accept correction counterfactually, this is rea-
son to think that, in the actual world, she is semantically deferential. Would
the resilient subject accept semantic correction in the counterfactual sce-
26is leaves open the possibility that the subject is still deferential with respect to dimen-
sions of the concept that are not relevant to the ameliorative project.
27is way of framing things is more congenial to externalist views of concepts. An inter-
nalist might rather say that an expert can inform you as to the properties of concepts that
you want to employ, but is not really in the business of telling you which concepts to want
in the rst place.
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nario?at is, would she treat factors such as dictionaries, communal usage,
or semantic experts as relevant to her application of the ameliorated con-
cept in the counterfactual world? Again, I think the answer is no. Whilst,
in this counterfactual scenario, she might learn that an expression is not
used as she thought it was in her community, she will not treat this is as a
reason to change her practice. In this scenario, she will not dispute what
the communal standards are, or suggest that the experts’ own understand-
ing of the concept they employ is incorrect. Rather she will dispute what
these standards ought to be: she has moral reasons to think that they ought
to be dierent. e subject will even resist correction from the conceptual
engineers from whom she learnt the concept in such a counterfactual sce-
nario. Suppose, for example, that the subject came to endorse the amelio-
rated marriageA through misunderstanding an engineer’s argument in the
counterfactual world (where this counterfactual misunderstanding matches
the Calhoun-inspired argument in the actual world). In such a case, a sub-
ject who treats moral reasons as overriding of semantic considerations will
not accept mere semantic correction even from this conceptual engineer.
e sort of evidence that will convince her to change her practice is, not
semantic evidence, but argument regarding which concept, morally speak-
ing, ought to be employed.28 She is, thus, precisely someone who rejects the
communal standards as they stand and so is not bound by them. As such,
she lacks the dispositions characteristic of semantic deference.
I will note two things about this understanding of the resilient subject
in closing. Firstly, whilst she will not be moved by semantic considerations,
she should not be stubborn in the face of good moral reasons to change her
concepts. In the present context, there are certain groups that she plausi-
bly ought to be especially open to learning from; for example, standpoint
theorists suggest that members of oppressed groups might be in a better po-
sition to gain, through critical reection, a more accurate perspective on
oppressive social relations (Hartsock 1983, Collins 2000); as such, they may
be better situated to engage in fruitful engineering projects. So, the resilient
subject can and should be open to changing her mind; but, if she does so, it
will be because she has been given (or has herself generated) moral reasons
that she nds compelling, not because of facts about how terms are used in
her community or by particular experts within it. Secondly, my approach
leaves open the possibility that agents can choose who to semantically defer
to for moral reasons. For example, perhaps an agent, while deliberating over
which ameliorated concept to employ, will ag a particular person as amoral
expert on the relevant topic from whom she will accept semantic correction
28is sort of dispute might be explicitly about concepts, or it might take the form of met-
alinguistic negotiation (Plunkett and Sundell 2013).
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on how to use certain concepts.is, I think, would amount to her accepting
moral testimony regarding which concepts to employ and then semantically
deferring to these moral experts with respect to her understanding and ap-
plication of those concepts.29 My approach does not suggest that an agent
cannot or should not do this. Indeed, there may be good moral reasons
for an individual to accept moral testimony regarding such matters. Wiland
(2017), for example, argues in favour of trusting themoral testimony of those
who suer epistemic harms due to identity prejudice in their audiences. A
variety of such harms have been identied in the literature (see, e.g., Collins
2000, Fricker 2007, Dotson 2011). Wiland argues that harms suered by in-
dividuals who are silenced and/or unjustly treated as lacking credibility can
be especially great when it ismoral testimony concerning their own subordi-
nated social experience that is disregarded by their audience.us, perhaps
an individual should be especially receptive to this kind of moral testimony.
I think that choosing which concepts to employ based on moral testimony
can be an important stage in the moral improvement of an individual’s con-
ceptual repertoire. However, for an ameliorative project of the sort under
consideration to succeed, the agent who endorses the new concept should
do more than rely on moral testimony.e ameliorative project should not
be considered successful until the individual achieves her own understand-
ing of the engineer’s (non testimony-based) moral reasons for endorsing the
concept.30
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the implementation of ameliorated con-
cepts, in some cases, requires that individuals eschew semantic deference,
at least with respect to certain dimensions of those concepts. e reason
for thinking this stems from consideration of the aims of conceptual engi-
neers engaged in ameliorative projects that aim atmoral goods such as social
equality: they seek conceptual change in order to contribute to the disman-
tling of oppressive social structures, institutions and systems of belief. e
view I have proposed is that, in order for engineers to achieve their aims, an
individual who adopts the ameliorated concept must not only understand
and endorse this concept but must do so for the moral reasons provided
29 Some authors argue that there is something puzzling or suboptimal about acceptingmoral
testimony. For diagnoses of this puzzle, see, e.g., (McGrath 2009), (Driver 2006), (Hills
2010).
30is is not quite the same as claiming that the individual must acquire moral understand-
ing in Hills’s (2010) sense. Hills’s notion of moral understanding is factive; whereas, as
noted above, a conceptual engineermight be trying to implement a concept that she falsely
believes to be morally superior.
96 Conceptual Engineering and Semantic Deference
by the conceptual engineer. Once they have acquired such reasons, how-
ever, they are no longer correctly described as semantically deferential; the
reasons to which they are ultimately responsive will be moral rather than
semantic.
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